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of a buyer as a merchant is to buy merchandise according to a merchandise plan, to sell so as to make a satisfactory profit, and to manipulate his purchases so as to secure the proper number of turnovers and leave his stock in good condition at the end of the season. This is a big job for any man, for merchandising is a life's work, and it calls for the best efforts of a real merchant. Such a man is the ideal buyer."

C. S. DUNCAN

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Free Speech for Radicals. By THEODORE SCHROEDER. Riverside, Conn.: Hillacre Bookhouse, 1916. Pp. viii+206.

This book might appropriately be entitled "Free Speech for I.W.W.'s and Anarchists," for on the whole it undertakes the defense of this "most despised of all classes." In general, the writer treats his subject in a dispassionate manner and the book makes interesting reading, but the reader frequently is challenged to make active rejoinders to the many sweeping conclusions. In defending the right of free speech the author's premise would be stated something like this: free speech is a natural right guaranteed by the Constitution; any abridgment of the right is an abridgment of the Constitution and therefore wrong.

The implication of the eighteenth-century philosophy is obvious; but to go to his definition (p. 20): "By freedom of speech I do not mean the right to agree with the majority, but the right to say with impunity anything and everything which one chooses to say . . . including even treason and assassination . . . and to speak it with impunity so long as no actual material injury results to anyone, and when it results . . . to punish only for the contribution to that material injury and not for the mere speech as such."

In the first place, the Constitution does not guarantee the right to everyone "to say with impunity anything and everything which one chooses"; this is a wrong interpretation, for the fundamental law merely restricts the commonwealths from passing anti-free-speech laws. But in order to satisfy his own logic Mr. Schroeder is forced to conclude that it is wrong to punish "free speech as such" because even to prefer the charge would violate the Constitution, even though crime be committed. In other words, the Constitution protects everyone against the charge of the abuse of free speech.

In the second place, his formula attempting a definition of police-power administration is, to say the least, amateurish. Does he mean that society must await "actual material injury" before undertaking self-protection? Evidently this is the idea, for on another page (p. 88) he states: "Freedom of speech is wrongfully abridged whenever an individual is suppressed or punished except on the basis of an ascertained, actual, and material injury or imminent danger thereof." The reader is left to imagine what kind of order would

prevail under such a régime. The added burden which such a scheme would impose upon the already overtaxed police force in keeping down crime makes it undesirable as a reform measure. Furthermore, if established in one case, why not in all cases of a similar nature, such as the carrying of concealed weapons, attempted assault, or even the incorporation of a blackmail trust?

The doctrine throughout leans toward extreme liberty, and when the author argues "that the state has no existence except as a few fallible office holders" (p. 4), and that the government "is a human expedient . . . subject to be abolished at the will of those who created it," and "that the legislature in protecting society must do it in such a way as not to prevent any single or social or personal use of that which is [merely] dangerous" (p. 113), and that "mere preparation such as might be useful in war, or in resistance to government but not followed by actual hostilities, is not treason" (p. 98), we accuse him of being the mere tool of his client, if not an active member of the clan.

In much the same vein he champions the right of freedom of the press, the disseminating of obscene literature, and the rights of personal liberty; and in this part many of his readers would advocate suppression.

Nearly one-half of the book is devoted to a description of the San Diego free-speech fight, which tells of the many inhumanities committed in the name of law and order over the free-speech right. It is far from the facts that intelligence is always brought to the solution of these acute crises in our civil experiences; a decided change is needed in the methods used to suppress anti-social demonstrations. The San Diego fight over free speech was a blot on the fair name of the nation; and a more constructive policy must be devised whereby a greater freedom of utterance than now exists is given to this class if the anarchy of San Diego is to be avoided. No doubt one of the greatest sources of social unrest and bitterness against the present order has been the attitude of the police toward public speaking. The man who gives vent to his feelings feels relieved, and is less impelled to commit violence than the man who broods over the suppression of his speech. Mr. Schreoder therefore concludes that the remedy lies in removing the justification and necessity for terrorism by establishing entire freedom of speech and of the press.

Will the granting of extreme liberty, as the author argues, solve the problem? Will this remedy the situation and give the anarchists what they are seeking for? The reviewer thinks not. Unhindered speech of the extreme type means the advocacy of the destruction of government—the advocacy of violent means to that end. It would end in violence, but not in the abolition of government, for the institution is founded on centuries-old traditions and obviously fills an indispensable function.

So long as law and order and the institution of government are sanctioned by society as contributory to progress, just so long will it resent any attempt to overthrow them; those who run counter to the general will must suffer in the contact.